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1.6 
The Institutionalization of 
Institutional Theory 
PAMELA S. TOLBERT AND LYNNE G. ZUCKER 
Since the publication of Meyer and Rowan's 
(1977) classic article, organizational analyses 
based on an institutional perspective have 
proliferated. Work sharing the banner of insti-
tutional theory has investigated a wide range of 
phenomena, from the spread of specific person-
nel policies (Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Baron et 
al. 1986; Edelman 1992) to the fundamental 
redefinition of organizational missions and 
forms piMaggio 1991; Fligstein 1985) to the 
development of domestic and international 
policies by government organizations (Strang 
1990; Zhou 1993). Ironically, however, the insti-
tutional approach has yet to become institutio-
nalized. There is very little consensus on the 
definition of key concepts, measures or methods 
within this theoretic tradition. Unlike population 
ecology and its standard measures of density, 
institutional theory has developed no central set 
of standard variables, nor is it associated with a 
standard research methodology or even a set of 
methods. Studies have relied on a variety of 
techniques, including case analysis, cross-sec-
tional regression, longitudinal models of various 
types, and so forth (see also Davis and Powell 
1992; Scott and Meyer 1994). Our review of the 
literature suggests one important source of such 
variation in approach: despite the sizeable body 
of work defined as part of this tradition, there 
has been surprisingly little attention given to 
cohc^tualizing and specifying the processes of 
institutionalization (though see DiMaggio 1991; 
Strang and Meyer 1993; and Rura and Miner 
1994 for recent progress in this direction). 
As noted in Zucker's (1977) early research, 
which focused on consequences of varying levels 
of institutionalization, institutionalization is 
both a process and a property variable. Perhaps 
because her work was cast in a small groups 
setting, however, a process-based approach to 
institutionalization has not been followed in 
most organizational analyses. Instead, institu-
tionalization is almost always treated as a 
qualitative state: structures are institutionalized, 
or they are not. Consequently, important quest-
ions of the determinants of variations in levels of 
institutionalization, and of how such variation 
might affect the degree of similarity among sets 
of organizations, have been largely neglected. 
In this chapter, we address these questions by 
offering a theoretical specification of institutio-
nalization processes. We begin by presenting a 
brief historical overview of sociological theoriz-
ing and research on organizations through the 
mid 1970s. This overview is intended both to 
clarify the links between institutional theory and 
previous traditions of sociological work on 
organizational structure, and to provide some 
context for understanding the receptivity of 
organizational researchers in the late 1970s to 
institutional theory as an explanatory frame-
work. The next section reviews the initial 
exposition of the theory in Meyer and Rowan's 
(1977) seminal article, focusing on the way in 
which it challenged then-dominant theoretical 
and empirical traditions in organizational 
research. We point up an apparent logical 
ambiguity in this formulation, one which in-
volves the phenomenological status of structural 
arrangements that are the objects of institution-
alization processes. In the remainder of the 
chapter, we offer a general model of institution-
alization processes, as a means both of clarifying 
this ambiguity and of elaborating the logical and 
176 HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 
empirical implications of a phenomenologically 
based version of institutional theory, first 
developed by Zucker. Finally, on the basis of 
this analysis, we consider a range of issues that 
require further theoretical development and 
empirical study. 
Our primary aims in this effort are twofold: to 
clarify the independent theoretical contributions 
of institutional theory to analyses of organiz-
ations, and to develop this theoretical perspec-
tive further in order to enhance its use in 
empirical research.1 There is also a more 
general, more ambitious objective here, and 
that is to build a bridge between two distinct 
models of social actor that underlie most 
organizational analyses, which we refer to as a 
rational actor model and an institutional model. 
The former is premised on the assumption that 
individuals are constantly engaged in calcula-
tions of the costs and benefits of different action 
choices, and that behavior reflects such utility-
maximizing calculations (Coleman 1990; Hech-
ter 1990). In the latter model, by contrast, 
'oversocialized' individuals are assumed to 
accept and follow social norms unquestioningly, 
without any real reflection or behavioral 
resistance based on their own particular, 
personal interests (see Wrong 1961). We suggest 
that these two general models should be treated 
not as oppositional but rather as representing 
two ends of a continuum of decision-making 
processes and behaviors. Thus, a key problem 
for theory and research is to specify the 
conditions under which behavior is more likely 
to resemble one end of this continuum or the 
other. In short, what is needed are theories of 
when rationality is likely to be more or less 
bounded. A developed conception of institution-
alization processes provides a useful point of 
departure for exploring this issue. 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES OF 
. ORGANIZATIONS: THE ORIGINS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Functionalist Analyses of Organizations 
The study of organizations has a relatively short 
history within sociology. Prior to the work of 
Robert Merton and his students in the late 
1940s, organizations were not typically acknowl-
edged as a distinctive social phenomenon, one 
worthy of study in its own right, by American 
sociologists. Although organizations had cer-
tainly been subjects of study by sociologists prior 
to the advent of functionalist analyses (see, for 
example, the work of American theorists 
associated with the Chicago School: Park 1922; 
Thomas and Znaniecki 1927), such studies 
typically treated organizations as aspects of 
general social problems, such as social inequal-
ity, intercommunity relations, social deviance, 
and so forth; the focus of analysis was not on 
organizations qua organizations. Despite the key 
role assigned to formal organizations by Weber's 
(1946) and Michels's (1962) analyses of indus-
trial orders, the notion that organizations 
represent independent social actors in modern 
societal processes was not widely recognized 
until after the pioneering work of Merton and 
colleagues (see Coleman 1980; 1990). As we shall 
explore later in our review, we conceive of both 
organizational and individual actors as potential 
creators of new institutional structure (Zucker 
1988). (See also DiMaggio's 1988 discussion of 
'institutional entrepreneurs'.) 
Merton's (1948) initial interest in studying 
organizations appears to have been driven 
primarily by a concern with empirically testing 
and developing the general logic of functionalist 
social theory. Organizations, viewed as societies 
in microcosm, offered the opportunity to 
conduct the kind of comparative research 
required for empirical examination of function-
alist tenets (see Selznick 1949; Gouldner 1950; 
Blau 1955). Thus, one of the major hallmarks of 
analyses of organizations produced by Merton 
and his students was a focus on the dynamics of 
social change, an issue functionalist theory had 
often been accused by its critics of neglecting 
(Turner 1974). 
Concern with change was reflected in two 
main objectives that were characteristic of 
organizational studies in the functionalist tradi-
tion: examining the nature of covariation among 
different elements of structure, and assessing the 
dynamic balance between dysfunctional and 
beneficial outcomes of given structural arrange-
ments. These foci directly address two key 
assumptions embedded in functionalist theory 
about survival requirements of social collectiv-
ities. 
The first assumption is that the structural 
components of a system must be integrated in 
order for the system to survive, since the 
components are interrelated parts of the whole. 
A corollary derived from this main assumption 
is that change in one structural component 
necessitates adaptive changes in other compo-
nents. Thus, given this, general theoretical 
framework, empirical examination of the rela-
tionships among elements of organizational 
structure was a natural focus of study. 
The second assumption is that existing 
structures contribute to a social system-'s 
functioning, at least on the balance; otherwise, 
the system could not survive. An implication of 
this assumption, adduced by Merton (1948), 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 111 
is that change is likely to occur when the 
functional contributions of a given structural 
arrangement are exceeded by dysfunctions 
associated with that arrangement. This reason-
ing led to an explicit concern with identifying 
both the dysfunctional and functional conse-
quences of given structural arrangements.2 
Quantitative Analyses of 
Structural Covariation 
Pursuit of the first problem, examination of 
interrelations among structural elements, laid the 
foundation for one general line of research that 
came to dominate and define sociological studies 
of organizations for the next two decades. This 
line of research increasingly came to be typified 
by quantitative analyses of covariance among 
the elements of formal organizational structure 
and by essentially economic explanations of such 
covariation. The rapid ascendance of this 
approach to organizational analysis most likely 
reflects its affinity with established traditions of 
organizational research in the field of manage-
ment science, well established in most business 
schools by the time sociologists turned their 
attention to the study of bureaucracy (Follett 
1942; Fayol 1949; Gulick and Urwick 1937; 
Woodward 1965). Formal structure was 
assumed to reflect organizational decision-
makers' rational efforts to maximize efficiency 
by securing coordination and control of work 
activities. Thus, the finding of a positive rela-
tionship between size and complexity was 
explained in terms of the needs and capacity of 
larger organizations for efficiency-enhancing 
specialization, the relation between complexity 
and size of the administrative component in 
terms of the increased needs for supervision to 
manage coordination problems accompanying 
specialization, and so forth.3 
Organizational research shifted focus in the 
late 1960s to include consideration of the effects 
of environmental forces in determining structure, 
but the basic functionalist/economic explanatory 
framework was retained by most work (see for 
example, Thompson 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967). Despite the dominance of this approach 
to analyzing and explaining formal organiza-
tional structure (or perhaps because of it), this 
paradigm came under increasing fire by the early 
1970s. In part, increasing skepticism reflected the 
general lack of cumulative empirical findings 
from work in this tradition (Meyer 1979). The 
widespread revival and reassessment of the 
general applicability of arguments developed 
earlier by Barnard (1938), Simon (1947), and 
March and Simon (1957), emphasizing inherent 
Bnnts on organizational decision-makers' ability 
to act with a high degree of rationality, may 
have also helped lay the groundwork for the 
acceptance of alternative paradigms (Weick 
1969). 
Reflecting the growing dissatisfaction with 
traditional explanations of formal structure, a 
new approach to organization-environment 
relations, labeled resource dependence (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978), became increasingly promi-
nent during the 1970s. This perspective focused 
attention on decision-makers' concerns for 
maintaining organizational autonomy and 
power over other organizations. By emphasizing 
the determining role of power considerations in 
explaining organizations' structure (see Thomp-
son and McEwen 1958), it challenged dominant 
theoretical approaches that focused largely or 
exclusively on production efficiency concerns. 
However, like earlier work, a resource depen-
dence approach also was predicated implicitly 
on a rational actor model of decision-making in 
organizations, albeit one in which actors' 
behavior was based on calculation aimed at 
maximizing power and autonomy rather than 
pure efficiency. The operation of social influence 
processes, such as imitation or normatively 
based conformity, which might mitigate or 
limit autonomous decision-making, was largely 
ignored. 
FORMAL STRUCTURE AS 
MYTH AND CEREMONY 
Symbolic Properties of Structure 
The analysis laid out in the now-classic paper by 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) thus offered a radical 
departure from conventional ways of thinking 
about formal structure and about the nature of 
organizational decision-making through which 
structure was produced. Their analysis was 
guided by a key insight, namely: formal struc-
tures have symbolic as well as action-generating 
properties. In other words, structures can 
become invested with socially shared meanings, 
and thus, in addition to their 'objective' func-
tions, can serve to communicate information 
about the organization to both internal and 
external audiences (Kamens 1977). Explaining 
formal structure from this vantage point offered 
organizational researchers the opportunity to 
explore an array of new insights into the causes 
and consequences of structure. 
The notion that organizations have symbolic 
aspects was not entirely novel: a variety of 
authors had previously underscored key sym-
bolic functions served by mission statements, 
structural arrangements, and top-level members 
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of organizations (Clark 1956; Selznick 1957; 
Zald and Denton 1963). In the functionalist 
tradition, such elements were argued to be criti-
cal to securing environmental support through 
demonstration of the consistency between core 
values of the organization and those in the larger 
society (Parsons 1956; 1960). Meyer and 
Rowan's contribution to this earlier, related 
work lay in their systematic development of the 
implications of the use of formal structure for 
symbolic purposes, particularly in terms of 
highlighting limitations of more rationalistic 
explanations of structure. 
Implications 
Based on the notion that formal structure can 
signal organizations' commitment to rational, 
efficient standards of organizing, and thus pro-
vide general social 'accounts' (Scott and Lyman 
1968), Meyer and Rowan's analysis specified 
three major implications of this notion. The first 
is that the adoption of formal structure can 
occur regardless of the existence of specific, 
immediate problems of coordination and control 
of members' activities that an organization may 
face. 
Organizations are driven to incorporate the 
practices and procedures defined by prevailing 
rationalized concepts of organizational work and 
institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so 
increase their legitimacy and their survival pro-
spects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the 
acquired practices and procedures. (1977: 340) 
This argument challenged then-dominant causal 
models of structure in several respects. First, in 
terms of the determinants of structure, it directed 
attention to external influences not linked to 
actual production processes, such as the passage 
of legislation and the development of strong 
social norms within an organizational network. 
In so doing, the relative importance of internal 
organizational characteristics traditionally inves-
tigated as sources of formal structure, such as 
size and technology, was called into question. It 
also indirectly suggested alternative ways of 
interpreting such characteristics (e.g. as indica-
tors both of organizations' visibility to the 
general public and of network linkages). 
Moreover, in terms of consequences or 
outcomes, it led to a focus on the adoption of 
specific structural arrangements that had 
acquired social meanings, such as formal 
employment policies, accounting and budgeting 
practices, and offices and positions associated 
with employment equity. This indirectly chal-
lenged the utility of existing theoretical and 
empirical efforts to conceptualize and measure 
structure in terms of general, abstract dimen-
sions, such as formalization, complexity, and 
centralization. 
A second major implication pointed up in 
Meyer and Rowan's analysis is that the social 
evaluation of organizations, and hence organiz-
ational survival, can rest on observation of 
formal structures (that may or may not actually 
function), rather than on observed outcomes 
related to actual task performance. 
Thus, organizational success depends on factors 
other than efficient coordination and control of 
production activities. Independent of their produc-
tive efficiency, organizations which exist in highly 
elaborated institutional environments and succeed in 
becoming isomorphic with these environments gain 
the legitimacy and resources needed to survive. 
(1977: 352) 
This claim sharply contradicted underlying 
market-oriented, or at least performance-
oriented, assumptions about the functions of 
formal structure that dominated previous work: 
(1) that inefficient organizations - in production 
terms - would be selected out through a process 
of interorganizational competition; and (2) that 
correlations between measures of formal struc-
ture and such characteristics as size and tech-
nology thus resulted from the survival of 
organizations whose form matched the demands 
of their production environments. Although 
these assumptions underpinned the majority of 
quantitative analyses of determinants of struc-
ture, they were often made explicit only in 
studies directly examining organizational effec-
tiveness (Goodman and Pennings 1977). The 
notion that organizations could survive despite 
very low objective performance implied the 
possibility of 'permanently failing' organizations 
(Meyer and Zucker 1989), that is organizations 
that survive despite evident inefficiencies that 
logically should cause them to fail. 
Finally, the third major implication derived by 
Meyer and Rowan was that the relationship 
between actual, everyday activities and beha-
viors of organizational members and formal 
structures may be negligible. 
. . . (F)onnal organizations are often loosely 
coupled . . . structural elements are only loosely 
linked to each other and to activities, rules are often 
violated, decisions are often unimplemented, or if 
implemented have uncertain consequences, technol-
ogies are of problematic efficiency, and evaluation 
and inspection systems are subverted or rendered so 
vague as to provide little coordination. (1977: 342) 
This implication also represented a direct 
challenge to traditional explanations of structure 
which, by treating formal structures as means for 
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coordinating and controlling activities, necess-
arily assumed a tight connection between 
structures and actual behaviors of organizational 
members. 
AMBIGUITIES IN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
In drawing this last implication, Meyer and 
Rowan decouple formal structure from action, 
implicitly defining institutional structures as 
those that are subject to decoupling. However, 
earlier in their argument they use the concept of 
institutional structures much as Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) and as Zucker (1977): a 
structure that has become institutionalized is one 
that has become taken for granted by members 
of a social group as efficacious and necessary; 
thus it serves as an important causal source of 
stable patterns of behavior. 
This creates an inherent ambiguity in their 
underlying phenomenological argument, because 
the definition of 'institutionalized' itself contra-
dicts the claim that institutional structures are 
apt to be decoupled from behavior. To be 
institutional, structure must generate action. As 
Giddens (1979) argues, structure that is not 
translated into action is in some fundamental 
sense not 'social' structure. Geertz sounds a 
similar note: 'We gain access to symbol systems 
only through the flow of behavior - or, more 
precisely, social action' (1973: 17). 
The discussion of the decoupling of structure 
and action implies a Goffmanesque 'backstage/ 
frontstage' definition of institutionalized struc-
tures (Goffman 1959), where the belief in the 
efficacy and need for such structures is subject to 
dispute but the structures are nonetheless viewed 
as serving a useful presentational purpose. This 
implies that such structures fundamentally lack 
normative and cognitive legitimacy (Delia Fave 
1986; Walker et al. 1986; Stryker 1994; Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994), and that they are not at any time 
real signals of underlying intention.- Whether 
such structures are appropriately described as 
institutionalized, given standard definitions of 
the term, is dubious. 
Resource Dependence versus 
Institutional Processes 
Moreover, the ambiguity that inheres in this 
view of structural change in organizations leads 
to a fundamental confounding of institutional 
and resource dependence theory (Zucker 1991: 
104). Scott (1987: 497) has argued that a shift in 
institutional theory towards explaining 'the 
sources or loci of "rationalized and impersonal 
prescriptions'" and away from explaining the 
'properties of generalized belief systems' has the 
advantage of enlarging the framework for 
explaining formal structures to include organiz-
ations' compliance with external actors' 
demands in order to obtain resources needed 
for survival. More recently, he elaborated: 
'Much of the theoretical and empirical research 
on institutions correctly focuses on regulative 
agencies . . . which exercise legitimate powers to 
formulate and enforce rule systems . . . [which 
leads to an emphasis on] the flow of rewards and 
sanctions' (1994: 98). In this formulation, 
however, there is a blurring of the boundary 
between resource dependence and institutional 
theojry, thereby obscuring the unique theoretical 
contributions of the latter, in particular, to 
organizational analysis. 
Comparison of recent studies based on 
institutional theory with earlier studies cast 
within the framework of resource dependence 
serves to illustrate problems of distinguishing 
these theoretical perspectives. For example, 
using an institutional perspective to examine 
the effects of government laws and policies on 
employment structures, Sutton et al. argue: 
'Faced with an apparently hostile legal environ-
ment, employers adopt due-process governance 
to cool out potentially litigious employees and 
demonstrate good-faith compliance with govern-
ment mandates' (1994: 946). Likewise, Edelman 
suggests that organizations that construct formal 
structures as symbolic gestures of compliance 
with government policy 'are less likely to 
provoke protest by protected classes of employ-
ees within the firm or community members who 
seek jobs . . . are more likely to secure govern-
ment resources (contracts, grants, etc.), and . . . 
are less likely to trigger audits by regulatory 
agencies' (1992: 1542). Thus, the adoption of 
structure is treated as a strategic, but apparently 
largely superficial change; it is the organizational 
counterpart of the manipulative actions of 
narcissistic persons who consciously use 'false 
fronts' as a means of gaining their own ends with 
other persons.4 
Other studies described in Pfeffer and Salan-
cik's (1978) development of resource dependence 
theory reflect a very similar explanatory logic. 
For example, they report (1978: 197-200) a case 
study by Pfeffer of an organization that 
intentionally created two separate structural 
units, one of which was non-profit, in order to 
conform to extant social definitions of appro-
priate form for educational organizations and to 
thereby secure necessary support from external 
constituents. Similarly, they describe (1978: 56-
9) research conducted by Salancik which 
examined the relationship between indicators of 
firms' visibility and relative dependence on 
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federal government contracts, and the presence 
of organizational arrangements showing com-
mitment to equal employment opportunity. The 
results indicated that greater dependence was 
associated with more intensive signaling of 
compliance with affirmative action law via 
creation of formal positions and written doc-
umentation of programs and policies. The 
overlap between these arguments and those 
from more recent work cast within the frame-
work of institutional theory is striking. 
The lack of theoretical distinctiveness in these 
studies results in part from the de-emphasis on a 
distinguishing feature of institutional theory, a 
focus on the role of cultural understandings as 
determinants of behavior (Strang 1994) and on 
the normative bounds of rational decision-
making. By shifting toward an emphasis on 
changes in 'appearance' and downplaying the 
internal consequences of institutionalized struc-
ture, treating structure as merely symbol and 
signal, we end up with the implicit argument that 
a structure can maintain its symbolic value in the 
face of widespread knowledge that its effect on 
individuals' behavior is negligible. How such a 
contradiction in cultural understandings (i.e. 
that structures signify commitment to some 
action, and that structures may be unrelated to 
action) can endure poses an unanswered riddle 
in this approach. 
There is a related, general problem with work 
that emphasizes purely symbolic, resource-
securing functions of structure, one which lies 
in the implicit assumption that the costs of 
creating such structural elements are relatively 
low compared to the potential gains in increased 
resources from the environment. This assump-
tion presumably follows from the notion that 
changes in formal structures often do not alter 
action. Although there are often-cited theoretical 
claims, there is no supporting empirical evidence 
that social activity is as ubiquitous as air and 
just as costless (Granovetter 1985). From the 
research to date, we do not know in fact whether 
structure is regularly decoupled from the internal 
functioning of the organization, nor do we know 
the cost of creating such structure compared to 
any increase in resource flows to the organiz-
ation (a review of the evidence can be found in 
Scott and Meyer 1994). 
The recasting of institutional theory to be 
more derivative of a resource dependence 
approach probably reflects, in part, general 
discomfort with the lack of voluntarism implied 
by more phenomenologically oriented versions 
of institutional theory, or what Oliver calls an 
'overly passive and conforming depiction of 
organizations' (1991: 146). It may also stem 
from the apparent bias toward stasis in a 
phenomenological approach (DiMaggio 1988): 
as currently developed in organizational ana-
lyses, the focus of an institutional approach 
traditionally has been on the way in which actors 
follow extant institutional 'scripts', and ques-
tions of how these scripts are produced, 
maintained and changed have been largely 
neglected (Barley and Tolbert 1988). It is these 
questions to which we turn next, using theor-
etical analyses by Berger and Luckmann (1967) 
and Zucker (1977) as our point of departure. 
In addressing these issues, we make the key 
assumption that creating new structure takes 
more resources than maintaining the old: 
alteration and creation of organizational struc-
tures do constitute costs for the organization. 
Social structure is not simply a by-product of 
human activity; rather, human agency is 
required to produce it (Zucker et al. 1995; 
Zucker and Kreft 1994). Thus, structures that 
are altered or created must be believed to have 
some positive value for the organization, or 
decision-makers typically would not allocate 
resources to altering or creating new formal 
structure. Organizational decision-makers, of 
course, may have more or less discretion: 
sometimes decision-making power is very 
broad, sometimes it is very circumscribed. The 
analysis developed here is most applicable to 
instances in which decision-makers have rela-
tively high levels of discretion concerning the 
adoption of structures.5 
PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Drawing on work identified with the philoso-
phical tradition of phenomenology, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) identified institutionalization 
as a core process in the creation and perpetua-
tion of enduring social groups. An institution, 
the outcome or end state of an institutionaliza-
tion process, was defined as 'a reciprocal 
typification of habitualized action by types of 
actors' (1967: 54; following Schutz 1962; 1967). 
In this definition, habitualized action refers to 
behaviors that have been developed empirically 
and adopted by an actor or set of actors in order 
to solve recurring problems. Such behaviors are 
habitualized to the degree that they are evoked 
with minimal decision-making effort by actors in 
response to particular stimuli. Reciprocal typi-
fication, in their use, involves the development of 
shared definitions or meanings that are linked to 
these habitualized behaviors (see Schutz 1962; 
1967). Since typifications entail classifications or 
categorizations of actors with whom the actions 
are associated, this concept implies that the 
meanings attributed to habitualized action have 
come to be generalized, that is, to be indepen-
dent of the specific individuals who carry out the 
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action. Zucker (1977) referred to this process of 
generalizing the meaning of an action as 
'objectification', and identified it as one of the 
key component processes of institutionalization. 
Earlier phenomenological analyses of institu-
tions, then, suggest at least two sequential 
processes involved in the initial formation of 
institutions and in their spread: habitualization, 
the development of patterned problem-solving 
behaviors and the association of such behaviors 
with particular stimuli; and objectification, the 
development of general, shared social meanings 
attached to these behaviors, a development that 
is necessary for the transplantation of actions to 
contexts beyond their point of origination. 
At a later point in their analysis, Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) suggest an additional aspect 
of institutionalization, one also identified by 
Zucker and termed 'exteriority'. Exteriority 
refers to the degree to which typifications are 
'experienced as possessing a reality of their own, 
a reality that confronts the individual as an 
external and coercive fact' (1967: 58). It is 
related to the historical continuity of typifica-
tions (Zucker 1977), and in particular, to the 
transmission of typifications to new members 
who, lacking knowledge of their origins, are apt 
to treat them as 'social givens' (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Tolbert 1988). We refer to the 
processes through which actions acquire the 
quality of exteriority as sedimentation. 
In an early experimental study, Zucker (1977) 
demonstrated that as the degree of objectifica-
tion and exteriority of an action increased, so 
did the degree of institutionalization (indicated 
by individuals' conformity to others' behavior), 
and that when institutionalization is high, then 
transmission of the action, maintenance of that 
action over time, and resistance of that action to 
change are all also high. Nelson and Winter 
(1982) find a similar process operating in the 
creation of task routines within organizations: 
more institutionalized routines are more readily 
transmitted to new employees. Thus, transmis-
sion is both causally and consequentially related 
to institutionalization. By enhancing the exter-
iority of a set of behaviors, transmission 
increases the degree to which those behaviors 
are institutionalized; institutionalization, in turn, 
affects the ease of subsequent transmission 
(Tolbert 1988). 
This set of sequential processes - habitualiza-
tion, objectification and sedimentation - sug-
gests variability in levels of institutionalization, 
. thus implying that some patterns of social 
behavior are more subject to critical evaluation, 
modification, and even ehmination than others. 
In short, such patterned behaviors can vary in 
terms of the degree to which they are deeply 
embedded in a social system (more objective, 
more exterior), and thus vary in terms of their 
stability and their power to determine behavior. 
Berger and Luckmann's analysis was focused 
on the occurrence of institutionalization pro-
cesses among individual actors, not organiz-
ational actors. Zucker's experimental research 
extended the analysis to organizations, but still 
at the micro-level. Organizational actors are 
distinguished by a number of properties -
hierarchical authority, potentially unlimited life-
span, unique legal responsibilities, and so forth 
(see Coleman 1980) - likely to affect the way in 
which institutionalization processes are played 
out. These processes are often played out 
between organizations as well as within them.6 
Thus, we consider the extension of this analysis 
specifically to institutional flows between formal 
organizations. Figure 1 presents a summary of 
our analysis of the process of institutionaliza-
tion, and the causal forces that are key at 
different points in the process.7 
Habitualization 
In an organizational context, the process of 
habitualization involves the generation of new 
structural arrangements in response to a specific 
organizational problem or set of problems, and 
the formalization of such arrangements in the 
policies and procedures of a given organization, 
or a set of organizations that confront the same 
or similar problems. These processes result in 
structures that can be classified as being at the 
pre-institutionalization stage. 
There are voluminous literatures on organiz-
ational innovation and on organizational change 
that are relevant to understanding these pro-
cesses (e.g. Quinn and Cameron 1988; Huber 
and GUck 1993). What is key for the purposes of 
our analysis, however, is that in this stage the 
creation of new structures in organizations is 
largely an independent activity. Since organiz-
ational decision-makers may' share a common 
core of knowledge and ideas that make an 
innovation feasible and attractive, the adoption 
of a given innovation may and often does occur 
in close association with adoption processes in 
other organizations (i.e. simultaneous invention). 
Organizations experiencing a problem may, as 
part of their search for solutions, also consider 
solutions developed by others (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Imitation may follow, but there is 
little sense of the necessity of this among 
organizational decision-makers, since there is 
no consensus on the general utility of the 
innovation. Hence, adoption can be predicted 
largely by characteristics that make a change 
technically and economically viable for a given 
organization (Anderson and Tushman 1990; 
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Leblebici et al. 1991) and by internal political 
arrangements that make organizations more or 
less receptive to change processes (see March 
and Simon 1957).8 
At the pre-institutionalization stage, then, 
there may be multiple adopters of a given 
structure, but these are likely to be compara-
tively few in number, limited to a circumscribed 
set of similar, possibly interconnected organiz-
ations facing similar circumstances, and to vary 
considerably in terms of the form of implemen-
tation. Such structures will not be the object of 
any sort of formal theorizing (Strang and Meyer 
1993), and knowledge of the structures among 
non-adopters - especially those that are not in 
direct, frequent interaction with adopters - will 
be extremely Umited, in terms of both operations 
and purpose (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Examples of structures at this stage of insti-
tutionalization can be readily found by compar-
ing the organizational charts of any set of similar 
organizations. Such comparisons will almost 
certainly reveal an array of offices and policies 
that are idiosyncratic to one or a limited subset 
of the organizations - directors of electronic 
communications, departments of poultry science, 
marketing/manufacturing liaisons, etc. These 
sorts of structures tend to be relatively imper-
manent, sometimes enduring only for the length 
of the incumbent's tenure (see Miner 1987; 
1991). 
Objectification 
The movement toward a more permanent and 
widespread status rests heavily on the next 
process, objectification, which accompanies the 
diffusion of structure. Objectification involves 
the development of some degree of social con-
sensus among organizational decision-makers 
concerning the value of a structure, and the in-
creasing adoption by organizations on the basis 
of that consensus. Such consensus can emerge 
through two different though not necessarily 
unrelated mechanisms. 
On one hand, organizations may use evidence 
gathered directly from a variety of sources (the 
news media, first-hand observation, stock prices, 
and so on) to assess the risk parameters of 
adopting a new structure. To the extent that the 
results of structural change are expected to 
generalize, the apparent outcomes for prior 
organizations will be a significant determinant of 
the next adoption decision. Thus, objectification 
of structure is partially a consequence of organiz-
ations' monitoring of competitors, and efforts to 
enhance relative competitiveness. Recycling 'old 
social inventions' is a low-cost strategy, involving 
investment of fewer 'social resources' than 
creating new organizational structure. 
By implication, diffusion of new structures to 
a given organization will have a lower hurdle 
than will creation de novo of comparable 
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structures in that same organization, because 
other organizations will have 'pre-tested' the 
structure, and decision-makers' perception of 
relative costs and benefits of adopting will be 
influenced by observations of other organiz-
ations' behavior. Thus, the more organizations 
that have adopted the structure, the more likely 
will decision-makers perceive the relative bal-
ance of costs and benefits to be favorable. 
Our arguments here are consistent with 
models of sequential decision-making recently 
developed by economists (Banerjee 1992; Bik-
chandani et al. 1992; see also David 1985). These 
models are premised on the assumptions that 
there is some degree of uncertainty in the 
Outcomes of different choices, and that decision-
makers will use information gained from 
observing the choices of others, as well as their 
own subjective assessments, in determining the 
'best' choice. Under these conditions, the more 
widespread a given choice becomes, the more 
likely are individuals to view it as an optimal 
choice, and the less influential will be decision-
makers' independent judgments of the value of 
the choice (see also Tolbert 1985; Abrahamson 
and Rosenkopf 1993).9 
Objectification and diffusion of structure can 
also be spearheaded by what is sometimes 
referred to in the organizational change literature 
as a 'champion' - often, in this case, a .set of 
individuals with a material stake in the promo-
tion of the structure (DiMaggio 1988). Thus, for 
example, advocates of government civil service 
rules were often drawn from elite families whose 
traditional access to local political office had been 
broken by the development of immigrant-
dominated machines (Tolbert and Zucker 1983); 
the spread of formalized selection procedures and 
performance evaluation procedures in businesses 
during the period following World War II was 
influenced by the promotional efforts of members 
of the emerging occupation of personnel manage-
ment (Baron et al. 1986); and the role currently 
played by consultants in the adoption of practices 
identified with total quality management is 
widely acknowledged (Reeves and Bednar 1994; 
Sitkin et al. 1994). DiMaggio (1991), Rowan 
(1982), Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988), Chaves 
(forthcoming) and Ritti and Silver (1986) also 
offer examples of the role of interest groups in 
promoting structural changes in organizations. 
Champions are most likely to emerge when 
there is a large potential 'market' for the 
innovation (e.g. when environmental changes 
have adversely affected the competitive positions 
of a number of established organizations). To be 
successful, champions must accomplish two 
major tasks of theorization (Strang and Meyer 
1993): creation of a definition of a generic 
organizational problem, a definition that includes 
specification of the set or category of organiz-
ational actors characterized by the problem; and 
justification of a particular formal structural 
arrangement as a solution to the problem on 
logical or empirical grounds (see also Galaskie-
wicz 1985). The first task involves generating 
public recognition of a consistent pattern of 
dissatisfaction or organizational failing that is 
characteristic of some array of organizations; the 
second task involves developing theories that 
provide a diagnosis of the sources of dissatisfac-
tion or failings, theories that are compatible with 
a particular structure as a solution or treatment. 
By identifying the set of organizations that 
face a defined problem and providing a positive 
evaluation of a structure as an appropriate 
solution, theorizing invests the structure with 
both jeneraTcognrtive"andnormatTv^ 
To be persuasive and effective, theorizing efforts 
must also provide evidence that the change is 
actually successful in at least some cases that can 
be examined by others considering the adoption 
of new structure. On the basis of such theorizing, 
and the accompanying evidence, champions 
encourage the diffusion of structures throughout 
a set of organizations that are not otherwise 
directly connected. 
Structures that have been subject to objecti-
fication and have become fairly widely diffused 
can be described as being at the stage of semi-
institutionalization. At this stage, adopters have 
typically become quite heterogeneous; conse-
quently, specific characteristics of organizations 
that were previously identified with adoption will 
have relatively limited predictive power (Tolbert 
and Zucker 1983). The impetus for diffusion 
shifts from simple imitation to a more normative 
base, reflecting implicit or explicit theorization 
of structures. As theorization develops and 
becomes more explicit, variance in the form 
that the structures take in different organizations 
should decline. 
Examples of structures that could be classified 
as being at this stage include team-based 
production, quality circles, gain-sharing com-
pensation plans, internal consultants, sensitivity 
training programs for management, managers of 
work/family policy, and employee assistance 
programs, among others. While such structures 
generally have a longer rate of survival in 
organizations compared to those in the pre-
institutionalized stage, clearly not all persist 
indefinitely. In fact, the ultimate fate of most 
such structures often invests them with a fad or 
fashion-like quality (Abrahamson 1991). This is 
because structures at the stage of semi-institu-
tionalization typically have a relatively short 
history. Thus, while they have acquired some 
degree of normative acceptance, adopters none-
theless are apt to remain cognizant of their 
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relatively untested quality, and consciously to 
monitor the accumulation of evidence (from 
their own organization as well as others) on the 
effectiveness of the structures. It is not until a 
structure has reached the stage of full institutio-
nalization that actors' propensity to engage in 
independent evaluation of the structures sig-
nificantly declines. 
Sedimentation 
Full institutionalization involves sedimentation, 
a process that fundamentally rests on the 
historical continuity of structure, and especially 
on its survival across generations of organiza-
tional members. Sedimentation is characterized 
both by the virtually complete spread of 
structures across the group of actors theorized 
as appropriate adopters, and by the perpetuation 
of structures over a lengthy period of time. Thus, 
it implies both 'width' and 'depth' dimensions of 
structures (Eisenhardt 1988). 
Identification of factors that affect the extent 
of diffusion and the long-term retention of a 
structure is thus key to understanding the process 
of sedimentation. One such factor that has been 
pointed up in a variety of studies is the existence 
of a set of actors who are somehow adversely 
affected by the structures and who are able to 
collectively mobilize against them. Covaleski and 
Dirsmith's (1988) analysis of legislative resis-
tance to a new budgeting arrangement in a 
university provides a within-organizational 
example of this sort of force. At an interorganiza-
tional level of analysis, Leblebici et al.'s (1991) 
depiction of changes in the radio broadcast 
industry highlights the crucial role of small 
competitor organizations that, disadvantaged by 
established practices, actively promote alterna-
tive practices in the industry^ Likewise, Rowan 
(1982), analyzing the spread of three different 
structures across school districts in California, 
underscored the role of conflicting interests in 
stemming institutionalization processes. 
Even in the absence of direct opposition, 
sedimentation may be truncated gradually 
because of a lack of demonstrable results 
associated with a structure. A weak positive 
relation between a given structure and desired 
outcomes may be sufficient to affect the spread 
and maintenance of structures, particularly if 
advocates continue to be actively involved in 
theorization and promotion. However, in many 
cases, the link between the structure and the 
intended outcomes is quite distant, and 
demonstration of impact exceedingly difficult. 
Given the development and promotion of 
alternative structures purported to achieve the 
same ends, organizations are likely to abandon 
older arrangements in favor of newer, promis-
ing structures (Abrahamson 1991; see analo-
gous arguments by Abbott 1988 concerning 
changes in occupational jurisdictions), at least 
if costs associated with the change are relatively 
low. 
Hence, full institutionalization of a structure is 
likely to depend on the conjoint effects of 
relatively low resistance by opposing groups, 
continued cultural support and promotion by 
advocacy groups, and positive correlation with 
desired outcomes. Resistance is likely to limit the 
spread of a structure among organizations 
identified by theorizing as relevant adopters, 
and continued promotion and/or demonstrable 
benefits are necessary to counteract entropic 
tendencies, and to thus ensure perpetuation of 
the structure over time (Zucker 1988). Examples 
of structures that could be characterized as fully 
institutionalized in the US range from tenure 
policies among higher education organizations, 
to beverage service on airplane flights, to the use 
of memos as a form of interoffice communica-
tion (Yates and Orlikowski 1992). 
The reversal of this process, or deinstitutional-
ization, is likely to require a major shift in the 
environment (e.g. long-lasting alterations in 
markets, radical change in technologies) which 
may then allow a set of social actors whose 
interests are in opposition to the structure to self-
consciously oppose it or to exploit its liabilities 
(see Rowan's 1982 description of the decline of 
health officers in schools following the advent of 
various vaccines; see also Aldrich 1979: 167; 
Davis et al. 1994). 
Table 1 summarizes our arguments about the 
characteristics and consequences of the compo-
nent processes of institutionalization. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
There are a number of implications of our 
analysis for empirical studies of organizations 
that draw upon institutional theory. Probably 
the most important implication, from our 
perspective, is the need to develop more direct 
measures and better documentation of claims of 
the institutionalization of structures, since out-
comes associated with a given structure are 
likely to depend on the stage or level of insti-
tutionalization. Depending on the scope and 
form of data collection, different procedures 
could be used for this. 
For example, analyses examining the level of 
institutionalization of contemporary structures 
could use survey research in which respondents 
were asked directly about the degree to which 
they perceived a given structure to be necessary 
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Table 1 Stages of institutionalization and comparative dimensions 
Dimension 
Processes 
Characteristics of adopters 
Impetus for diffusion 
Theorization activity 
Variance in implementation 
Structure failure rate 
Pre-institutionalization 
stage 
Habitualization 
Homogeneous 
Imitation 
None 
High 
High 
Semi-institutionalization 
stage 
Objectification 
Heterogeneous 
Imitative/normative 
High 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Full institutionalization 
stage 
Sedimentation 
Heterogeneous 
Normative 
Low 
Low 
Low 
for efficient organizational functioning (e.g. 
Rura and Miner 1994), or use questionnaires 
that ask about attributes correlated with degree 
of institutionalization, such as the degree of 
subjective certainty about judgments made 
(Zucker 1977). While the development of items 
used to create adequate measures would un-
doubtedly be a contentious task, this is hardly a 
problem peculiar to the construct of institution-
alization (we think of such standard concepts as 
productivity, effectiveness, uncertainty, for 
example). As with other difficult constructs, 
this problem could be grappled with in part 
through standard psychometric techniques. 
Historical research utilizing archival data, on 
the other hand, could deal with the problem 
through more careful attention to and docu-
mentation of historical context and cultural 
changes surrounding the purported institutional-
ization of structures (Zucker 1988). Content 
analysis of written materials can, in some in-
stances, provide a useful indicator of the cultural 
status of structures (Tolbert and Zucker 1983). 
Whatever methodology is used to collect data, 
however, plausible claims about the level of 
institutionalization of structures are likely to rest 
on a strategy involving triangulation of both 
sources and methods. 
In addition, our analysis suggests that 
identification of the determinants of changes in 
the level of institutionalization of structures 
represents an important and promising avenue 
for both theoretical and empirical work. Extant 
studies have already suggested a number of 
potential determinants of how taken for granted 
a specific structure becomes, and thus how insti-
tutionalized. For example, a number of studies 
have shown that when large and more centrally 
linked organizations are innovators and early 
adopters of a given structure, that structure is 
more likely to become fully institutionalized 
than other structures (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Fligstein 1985; 1990; Baron et al. 1986; 
Davis 1991; Palmer et al. 1993). Further, work 
by Mezias (1990) and his colleagues (Mezias and 
Scarseltetta 1994) suggests that the social status 
of forces opposing the adoption of a structure 
may operate in the opposite direction: as the 
status of those opposed increases, the degree of 
institutionalization decreases. 
There are other factors that, intuitively, we 
would also expect to have an impact on insti-
tutionalization, including: the scope or range of 
organizations for which a given structure is 
theorized to be relevant (the broader the range of 
organizations, the more difficult it should be to 
provide convincing evidence of a structure's 
effectiveness, and hence the lower the level of 
institutionalization); the number of 'champions' 
or size of champion groups (the greater the 
number of champions, the less likely are entropic 
processes to become operative, and thus the 
higher the level of institutionalization); the degree 
to which adoption of a structure is linked to costly 
changes in adopting organizations (higher invest-
ment costs should also mitigate entropic tenden-
cies, thus resulting in a higher degree of 
institutionalization); the strength of the correla-
tion between adoption and desired outcomes 
(creating strong incentives to maintain the 
structure, thus resulting in a higher degree of 
institutionalization); and so forth. 
Studying the determinants of institutionaliza-
tion processes is likely to require comparative 
work on the development and spread of different 
structures. This might involve, for example, the 
construction and comparison of several natural 
histories of structures that have been recently 
made the object of theorizing - quality circles, 
employee assistance programs, telecommuting 
policies, and so forth. Comparative case studies 
of this sort could provide important insights into 
whether (or not) there are any similarities in the 
processes through which adoption and diffusion 
of different types of structures occur. 
Alternatively, useful insights could also be 
provided by comparisons of the diffusion and 
fate of a given structure across several industries 
or across several countries (see Strang and Tuma 
1993). Such research has the potential to address 
a number of puzzles about institutionalization 
processes that are suggested by various empirical 
observations. Why do some structures (e.g. 
team-based production) leap industries and not 
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others (e.g. tenure systems)? Are institutionaliza-
tion processes always less likely to affect 
structures in small organizations (Han 1994) 
and, if so, why? Why are biotechnological 
innovations located primarily in new small 
firms in the US, but primarily in large incumbent 
firms in Japan (Zucker and Darby 1994)? 
A final major implication that we would draw 
from our analysis is the need to consider the 
contexts or conditions under which institutional, 
resource dependence and efficiency-oriented 
contingency theories are each more likely to 
provide useful insights for organizational scho-
lars. Unfortunately, different theories often lead 
to the same predicted organizational outcomes -
although the mechanisms that are postulated to 
produce the outcomes are quite different. Hence, 
it is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine whether the factors highlighted by 
a given theoretical perspective are actually at 
work in detenriining organizational actions. 
Because of this, it may be useful to confine 
empirical 'tests' of institutional theory to studies 
that are set in contexts where there are no major 
actors that are attempting to compel organiz-
ations to adopt a given structure, either through 
law or through the withholding of critical 
resources. Or it may be useful to compare 
directly unconstrained adoption processes to 
those that have some coercive elements, as in our 
examination of the adoption of civil service 
reform in states where it was not required by law 
and in states where it was legally required 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1983). 
Likewise, it may also be useful to focus 
empirical application of institutional theory on 
analyses where the material benefits associated 
with a structure are not readily calculable (which 
is the case for many administrative innovations, 
as well as some technical innovations) - i.e. 
where efficiency-oriented contingency ap-
proaches are less obviously relevant. Or, again, 
it may be useful to assess how social institutions 
are used to increase material benefits, as for 
example when scientific collaborators tend to be 
selected from the same organization, effectively 
using the organizational boundaries as informa-
tion envelopes to protect new discoveries from 
early exploitation by others (Zucker et al. 1995). 
CONCLUSIONS 
By highhghting the role of normative influences 
in organizational decision-making processes, 
institutional theory offers an important and 
distinctive extension to our repertoire of per-
spectives and approaches to explaining organiz-
ational structure. While the notion that decision-
makers are characterized by bounded rationality 
has become a staple component of the catechism 
of organizational research, the implications of 
this are not explored in any depth in most 
contemporary theories.10 How rationality is 
bounded and under what conditions it will be 
more or less bounded are questions that have 
rarely been addressed. Institutional theory offers 
a framework that can be useful in addressing 
these questions, but its utility in this respect 
requires further development of the theory to 
clarify the conditions and processes that lead 
structures to become institutionalized. A clearer 
understanding of institutionalization as a process 
would allow us to specify the impact of more 
social aspects of decision-making, such as the 
effects of social position of those providing 
information on choices made, and the conditions 
under which prediction of a particular choice is 
possible only if the social aspects are directly 
included in the analysis. 
Addressing this general issue of conditions of 
applicability requires consideration of a number 
of problems: how and when choices or alternative 
lines of action become socially defined; who acts 
to cause change and to diffuse that change to 
multiple organizations, and why; and what are 
the potential benefits of creating similar struc-
tures, or converging to the same structures, that 
lead to the institutional isomorphism we so often 
observe. For institutional theory to develop as a 
coherent paradigm and thus to make an enduring 
contribution to organizational analyses, such 
questions about institutionalization processes 
require both conceptual and empirical answers. 
In this analysis, we have outlined some initial 
answers to these problems, answers whose 
extension and modification must await further 
theoretical development and empirical test. 
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1 Here we concentrate our analysis on institutiona-
lization processes at the interorganizational level. 
Similar processes are likely to operate at the 
intraorganizational level as well, though the exact 
mechanisms as well as the consequences may differ. 
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See Tolbert (1988), Rura and Miner (1994) and Barley 
and Tolbert (1988) for discussions of the relation 
between intraorganizational and interorganizational 
processes. See Zucker (1977) for a discussion and 
experimental test of intraorganizational processes and 
consequences. 
2 The evolution of this line of research includes 
work focusing on the relation between formal structure 
and the 'informal organization' and particularly on 
power relations among organizational members (e.g. 
Blau 1955; Zald and Berger 1978; Perrow 1984). 
Perhaps because such work was less compatible with 
extant management science literature, it did not 
achieve prominence as rapidly in the sociological 
literature on organizations as did work focusing on 
covariation among structural elements. 
3 See, for example, Stinchcombe (1959), Thompson 
(1967), Pugh et al. (1969), Blau (1970). Hall (1987) 
provides a thorough review and summary of the 
findings of this literature. 
4 Another individual-level analog is ingratiation, in 
which flattery and exaggerated compliance are used to 
meet personal needs by altering the response of 
someone with power or authority (Jones 1964; Jones 
and Wortman 1973). See also Elsbach and Sutton 
(1992) for a discussion of impression management by 
organizations. 
5 D'Aunno et al. (1991) describe the way in which 
conflicting demands placed on community mental 
health organizations by different constituencies result 
in the adoption of incompatible and contradictory 
practices. We suggest that such contradictions in 
structure are most likely to occur when managers have 
little discretion over the adoption of structural changes. 
6 We leave for later development change processes 
that operate inside a given organization. Inertia within 
organizations is often assumed to block internal 
change or at least to make it extremely difficult 
(Kanter 1983; 1989). Yet institutionalization processes 
are likely to be very important in internal organiz-
ational functioning (Zucker 1977; Pfeffer 1982). 
7 As John Meyer pointed out to us, this model may 
be most applicable to societies that are characterized 
by relatively weak national states. 
8 Leblebici et al. (1991) point out that when the 
advantages of an innovation are unclear, it is often 
smaller, less competitively advantaged firms who are 
most likely to adopt first, because the relative risks of 
making an error by adopting are lower for such firms. 
9 This process of theorization has already been 
expUcitly developed and empirically tested on the 
individual level as diffuse status characteristics (key 
references include Berger et al. 1972; Webster and 
Driskell 1978; Zelditch et al. 1980; Ridgeway and 
Berger 1986). It is easier to see errors in the 
generalization process when personal attributes such 
as gender or ethnicity are analyzed. But we expect 
similar errors at the organizational level. 
10 A good example is provided by transactions costs 
theory (Williamson 1975), which is expUcitly premised 
on the assumption of bounded rationaUty. However, 
work in this tradition appears to be predicated implicitly 
on the assumption that decision-makers are capable of 
carrying out extremely complex calculations required to 
estimate the relative transaction costs associated with 
different relational forms, and selecting an appropriate 
course of action based on those calculations (i.e. of 
relatively unbounded rationaUty). 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Abbott, Andrew (1988) The System of Professions. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Abrahamson, Eric (1991) 'Managerial fads and 
fashions: the diffusion and rejection of innovations', 
Academy of Management Review, 16: 586-612. 
Abrahamson, Eric and Rosenkopf, Lori (1993) 
'Institutional and competitive bandwagons: using 
mathematical modeling as a tool to explore 
innovation diffusion', Academy of Management 
Review, 18: 487-517. 
Aldrich, Howard (1979) Organizations and Environ-
ments. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-HaU. 
Aldrich, Howard and Fiol, Marlene (1994) 'Fools rush 
in? The institutional context of industry creation', 
Academy of Management Review, 19: 645-70. 
Anderson, PhiUp and Tushman, Michael (1990) 
'Technological discontinuities and dominant design: 
a cycUcal model of technological change', Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 35: 604-33. 
Banerjee, Abbijit (1992) 'A simple model of herd 
behavior', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:797-
817. 
Barley, Stephen and Tolbert, Pamela (1988) 'Institutio-
nalization as structuration: Methods and analytic 
strategies for studying links between action and 
structure'. Paper presented at the Conference on 
Longitudinal Field Research Methods, University of 
Texas, Austin, TX. 
Barnard, Chester (1938) Functions of the Executive. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Baron, James, Dobbin, Frank and Jennings, P. 
Devereaux (1986) 'War and peace: the evolution of 
modern personnel administration in U.S. industry', 
American Journal of Sociology, 92: 384-411. 
Berger, Joseph, Cohen, Bernard P. and Zelditch, Morris 
Jr (1972) 'Status characteristics and social interac-
tion', American Sociological Review, 37: 241-55. 
Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas (1967) Social 
Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor Books. 
Bikchandani, Sushil, Hirshleifer, David and Welch, Ivo 
(1992) 'A theory of fads, fashion, custom and cultural 
change as informational cascades', Journal of 
Political Economy, 100: 992-1026. 
Blau, Peter (1955) The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Blau, Peter (1970) 'A formal theory of differentiation in 
188 HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 
organizations', American Sociological Review, 35: 
201-18. 
Chaves, Mark (1996) 'Ordaining women: the diffusion 
of an organizational innovation', American Journal 
of Sociology, 101: 840-73. 
Clark, Burton (1956) 'Organizational adaptation and 
precarious values', American Sociological Review, 
21-7. 
Coleman, James (1980) Power and the Structure of 
Society. New York: Norton. 
Coleman, James (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Covaleski, Mark and Dirsmith, Mark (1988) 'An 
institutional perspective on the rise, social transfor-
mation and fall of a university budget category', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33: 562-87. 
D'Aunno, Thomas, Sutton, Robert and Price, Richard 
(1991) 'Isomorphism and external support in 
conflicting institutional environments: A study of 
drug abuse treatment units', Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 34: 636-61. 
David, Paul (1985) 'Clio and the economics of 
QWERTY', American Economic Review, 75: 332-7. 
Davis, Gerald (1991) 'Agents without principles? The 
spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate 
network', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 583— 
613. 
Davis, Gerald and Powell, Walter (1992) 'Organiz-
ation-environment relations', in M. Dunnette and L. 
Hough (eds), Handbook of Industrial and Organiz-
ational Psychology, vol. 3. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press, pp. 317-75. 
Davis, Gerald, Diekmann, Kristina and Tinsley, 
Catherine (1994) 'The deinstitutionalization of 
conglomerate firms in the 1980s', American Socio-
logical Review, 59: 547-70. 
Delia Fave, L. Richard (1986) 'Toward an explication 
of the legitimation process', Social Forces, 65: 476-
500. 
DiMaggio, Paul (1988) 'Interest and agency in 
institutional theory', in Lynne G. Zucker (ed.), 
Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and 
Environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. pp. 3-22. 
DiMaggio, Paul (1991) 'Constructing an organizational 
field as a professional project: U.S. art museums, 
1920-1940', in W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds), 
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 267-92. 
DiMaggio, Paul and Powell, Walter (1983) 'The iron 
cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collec-
tive rationality in organizational fields', American 
Sociological Review, 48: 147-60. 
Edelman, Lauren (1992) 'Legal ambiguity and symbolic 
structures: organizational mediation of civil rights 
law', American Journal of Sociology, 97: 1531-76. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen (1988) 'Agency and institutional 
theory explanations: the case of retail sales 
competition', Academy of Management Journal, 30: 
488-511. 
Elsbach, Kimberly and Sutton, Robert (1992) 'Acquir-
ing organizational legitimation through illegitimate 
actions: a marriage of institutional and impression 
management theories', Academy of Management 
Journal, 35: 699-736. 
Fayol, Henri (1949) General and Industrial Manage-
ment. London: Pitman. 
Fligstein, Neil (1985) 'The spread of the multidivisional 
form among large firms, 1919-1979', American 
Sociological Review, 50: 377-91. 
Fligstein, Neil (1990) The Transformation of Corporate 
Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Follett, Mary (1942) Dynamic Administration. New 
York: Harper. 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph (1985) 'Professional networks and 
the institutionalization of a single mind-set', 
American Sociological Review, 50: 639-58. 
Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Giddens, Anthony (1979) Central Problems in Social 
Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in 
Social Analysis. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Goffman, Irving (1959) Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life. New York: Doubleday. 
Goodman, Paul and Pennings, Johann (1977) New 
Perspectives on Organizational Effectiveness. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Gouldner, Alvin (1950) Patterns of Industrial Bureau-
cracy. Glencoe, IX: Free Press. 
Granovetter, Mark (1985) 'Economic action and social 
structure: the problem of embeddedness', American 
Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510. 
Gulick, Luther and Urwick, L. (eds) (1937) Papers on 
the Science of Administration. New York: Institute of 
Public Administration, Columbia University. 
Hall, Richard (1987) Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Han, Shin-Kap (1994) 'Mimetic isomorphism and its 
effect on the audit services market', Social Forces, 73: 
637-64. 
Hechter, Michael (1990) Social Institutions: their 
Emergence, Maintenance, and Effects. New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter. 
Huber, George and Glick, William (1993) Organiz-
ational Change and Redesign: Ideas and Onsightsfor 
Improving Performance. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Jones, E.E. (1964) Ingratiation. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts. 
Jones, E.E. and Wortman, C.B. (1973) Ingratiation: an 
Attributional Approach. Morristown, NJ: General 
Learning Press. 
Kamens, David (1977) 'Legitimating myths and 
educational organization: the relationship between 
organizational ideology and formal structure', 
American Sociological Review, 42: 208-19. 
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss (1983) The Change Masters: 
Innovation for Productivity in the American Corpora-
tion. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss (1989) When Giants Learn to 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 189 
Dance: Mastering the Challenge of Strategy, 
Management, and Careers in the 1990s. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
Lawrence, Paul and Lorsch, Jay (1967) Organization 
and Environment. Boston: Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University. 
Leblebici, Hussein, Salancik, Gerald, Copay, Anne and 
King, Tom (1991) 'Institutional change and the 
transformation of interorganizational fields: an 
organizational history of U.S. radio broadcasting 
industry', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 333— 
63. 
March, James and Simon, Herbert (1957) Organiz-
ations. New York: Wiley. 
Merton, Robert (1948) 'Manifest and latent functions', 
in R. Merton (ed.), Social Theory and Social 
Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, pp. 37-59. 
Meyer, John and Rowan, Brian (1977) 'Institutiona-
lized organizations: formal structure as myth and 
ceremony', American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-
63. 
Meyer, Marshall (1979) 'Organizational structure as 
signaling', Pacific Sociological Review, 22: 481-500. 
Meyer, Marshall and Zucker, Lynne (1989) Perma-
nently Failing Organizations. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage. 
Mezias, Stephen (1990) 'An institutional model of 
organizational practice: financial reporting at the 
Fortune 200', Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 
431-51. 
Mezias, Stephen and Scarselletta, Mario (1994) 
'Resolving financial reporting problems: an institu-
tional analysis of the process', Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 30: 654-78. 
Michels, Robert (1962) Political Parties. New York: 
Free Press. 
Miner, Anne (1987) 'Idiosyncratic jobs in formal 
organizations', Administrative Science Quarterly, 
32: 327-51. 
Miner, Anne (1991) 'Organizational evolution and the 
social ecology of jobs', American Sociological 
Review, 56: 772-85. 
Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney (1982) An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Oliver, Christine (1991) 'Strategic responses to institu-
tional processes', Academy of Management Review, 
16: 145-79. 
Palmer, Donald, Jennings, P. Devereaux and Zhou, 
Xueguang (1993) 'Late adoption of the multi-
divisional form by large U.S. corporations: 
institutional, political and economic accounts', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 100-31. 
Park, Robert E. (1922) The Immigrant Press and its 
Control. New York: Harper and Row. 
Parsons, Talcott (1956) 'Suggestions for a sociological 
approach to the theory of organizations', Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 1: 63-85. 
Parsons, Talcott (1960) Structure and Process in Modern 
Societies. New York: Free Press. 
Perrow, Charles (1984) Normal Accidents. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1982) Organizations and Organization 
Theory. Boston: Pitman. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Salancik, Gerald (1978) External 
Control of Organizations. New York: Harper and 
Row. 
Pugh, D.S., Hickson, D.J. and Hillings, C.R. (1969) 'An 
empirical taxonomy of structures of work organiz-
ations', Administrative Science Quarterly, 14: 115— 
26. 
Quinn, Robert and Cameron, Kim (1988) Paradox and 
Transformation: Toward a Theory of Change in 
Organization and Management. Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger. 
Reeves, Carol and Bednar, David (1994) 'Defining 
quality: alternatives and implications', Academy of 
Management Review, 19: 419-45. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. and Berger, Joseph (1986) 
'Expectations, legitimation and dominance behavior 
in task groups', American Sociological Review, 51: 
603-17. 
Ritti, Richard and Silver, Jonathan (1986) 'Early 
processes of institutionalization: the dramaturgy of 
exchange in interorganizational relations', Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 31: 25-42. 
Rowan, Brian (1982) 'Organizational structure and the 
institutional environment: the case of public schools', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 27: 259-79. 
Rura, Thekla and Miner, Anne (1994) 'Degrees of 
institutionalization in organizational routines'. 
Working paper 9-94-16, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, School of Business. 
Schutz, Alfred (1962) Collected Papers: the Problem of 
Social Reality, edited by M. Natanson. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
Schutz, Alfred (1967) The Phenomenology of the Social 
World. Evanston, JJL: Northwestern Press. 
Scott, Marvin and Lyman, Stanford (1968) 'Accounts', 
American Sociological Review, 33: 46-62. 
Scott, Richard (1987) 'The adolescence of institutional 
theory', Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 493-
511. 
Scott, Richard (1994) 'Institutional analysis: variance 
and process theory approaches', in W.R. Scott and 
J.W. Meyer (eds), Institutional Environments and 
Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individu-
alism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 81-99. 
Scott, Richard and Meyer, John (1994) Institutional 
Environments and Organizations: Structural Com-
plexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Selznick, Philip (1949) TV A and the Grassroots. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Selznick, Philip (1957) Leadership in Administration. 
New York: Harper and Row. 
Simon, Herbert (1947) Administrative Behavior. New 
York: Free Press. 
Sitkin, Sim, Sutcliffe, Kathleen and Schroeder, Roger 
(1994) 'Distinguishing control from learning in total 
190 HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 
quality management: a contingency perspective', 
Academy of Management Review, 19: 537-64. 
Stinchcombe, Arthur (1959) 'Bureaucratic and craft 
administration of production: a comparative study', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 4: 168-87. 
Strang, David (1990) 'From dependency to sovereignty: 
an event history analysis of decolonization 1870-
1987', American Sociological Review, 55: 846-60. 
Strang, David (1994) 'Institutional accounts of organiz-
ations as a form of structural analysis', Current 
Perspectives in Social Theory, 1:151-74. Greenwich, 
CT: JAI Press. 
Strang, David and Meyer, John (1993) 'Institutional 
conditions for diffusion', Theory and Society, 22: 
487-511. 
Strang, David and Tuma, Nancy (1994) 'Spatial and 
temporal heterogeneity in diffusion', American 
Journal of Sociology, 99: 614-39. 
Stryker, Robin (1994) 'Rules, resources and legitimacy 
processes: some implications for social conflict, order 
and change', American Journal of Sociology, 99:847-
910. 
Sutton, John, Dobbin, Frank, Meyer, John and Scott, 
W.R. (1994) 'The legalization of the workplace', 
American Journal of Sociology, 99: 944-71. 
Thomas, W.I. and Znaniecki, Florian (1927) The Polish 
Peasant in Europe and America. New York: Dover. 
Thompson, James (1967) Organizations in Action. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Thompson, James and McEwen, William (1958) 
'Organizational goals and environment: goal-setting 
as an interaction process', American Sociological 
Review, 23: 23-31. 
Tolbert, Pamela S. (1985) 'Institutional environments 
and resource dependence: sources of administrative 
structure in institutions of higher education', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 30: 1-13. 
Tolbert, Pamela S. (1988) 'Institutional sources of 
culture in major law firms', in L. Zucker (ed.), 
Institutional Patterns in Organizations: Culture and 
Environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. pp. 101-
13. 
Tolbert, Pamela S. and Zucker, Lynne (1983) 
'Institutional sources of change in the formal 
structure of organizations: the diffusion of civil 
service reform, 1880-1935', Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28: 22-39. 
Turner, Jonathan (1974) The Structure of Sociological 
Theory. New York: Dorsey. 
Walker, Henry, Thomas, George and Zelditch, Morris 
(1986) 'Legitimation, endorsement and stability', 
Social Forces, 64: 620-43. 
Weber, Max (1946) The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization (1924 in German), edited by A.M. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Glencoe, IL: Free 
Press. 
Webster, Murray Jr. and Driskell, James E. (1978) 
'Status generalization: a review and some new data', 
American Sociological Review, 43: 220-36. 
Weick, Karl (1969) Social Psychology of Organizations. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Williamson, Oliver (1975) Markets and Hierarchies. 
New York: Free Press. 
Woodward, Joan (1965) Industrial Organization: 
Theory and Practice. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Wrong, Dennis (1961) 'The over-socialized conception 
of man in modern sociology', American Sociological 
Review, 26: 183-93. 
Yates, Joanne and Orlikowski, Wanda (1992) 'Genres 
of organizational communication: a structurational 
approach to studying communication and media', 
Academy of Management Review, 17: 299-326. 
Zald, Mayer and Berger, Michael (1978) 'Social 
movements in organizations: coup d'etat, insurgency 
and mass movements', American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 83: 823-61. 
Zald, Mayer and Denton, Patricia (1963) 'From 
evangelism to general service: the transformation of 
the YMCA', Administrative Science Quarterly, 8: 
214-34. 
Zelditch, Morris Jr, Lauderdale, Patrick and Stublarec, 
Stephen (1980) 'How are inconsistencies between 
status and ability resolved?', Social Forces, 58:1025-
43. 
Zhou, Xueguang (1993) 'Occupational power, state 
capacities, and the diffusion of licensing in the 
American states: 1890-1950', American Sociological 
Review, 58: 536-52. 
Zucker, Lynne G. (1977) 'The role of institutionaliza-
tion in cultural persistence', American Sociological 
Review, 42: 726-43. 
Zucker, Lynne G. (1988) 'Where do institutional 
patterns come from? Organizations as actors in 
social systems', in Lynne G. Zucker (ed.), Institu-
tional patterns and organizations: Culture and 
environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. pp. 23-49. 
Zucker, Lynne G. (1991) 'Postscript: microfoundations 
of institutional thought', in Walter W. Powell and 
Paul J. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 103-7. 
Zucker, Lynne G. and Darby, Michael R. (1994) 'The 
organization of biotechnology science and its 
commercialization in Japan', UCLA Institute for 
Social Science Research Working Papers in the 
Social Sciences, Volume 6, Number 1, August. 
Zucker, Lynne G. and Kreft, Ita G.G. (1994) 'The 
evolution of socially contingent rational actions: 
effects of labor strikes on change in union founding in 
the 1880s', in J. Baum and J.V. Singh (eds), 
Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizations. New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 294-313. 
Zucker, Lynne G., Darby, Michael R., Brewer, 
Marilynn B. and Peng, Yusheng (1995) 'Collabora-
tion structure and information dilemmas in 
biotechnology: organizational boundaries as trust 
production', in R. Kramer and T. Tyler (eds), Trust 
in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
